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Chairman Thornberry, members of the sub-committee and staff, I am pleased to have the 
opportunity to comment today on the evolution of US government strategic 
communication (SC) and information operations (IO) since 9/11.   
I am currently a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center, but I recently 
returned from a two year public service leave of absence to work at the Defense 
Department as a senior advisor to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele 
Flournoy. I had a range of responsibilities during that time, including responsibility for 
advising Under Secretary Flournoy on strategic communication and information 
operations issues, as well as responsibility for creating a new rule of law office.  
In 2010, I headed a DoD-wide Front End Assessment study that evaluated DoD strategic 
communication and IO policy, definitions, oversight, resources and training. The 
conclusions of the Front End Assessment team led Secretary Robert Gates to order 
significant reforms, memorialized in his memo on this topic dated January 25, 2011, a 
memo I believe many of you have seen. While I do not intend to focus in these prepared 
remarks on the DoD-specific changes we spearheaded, I would be happy to provide any 
details during the discussion.  
I know that members of this sub-committee are deeply committed to ensuring that reform 
of strategic communication organizational structures and policies remains a top priority 
for the executive branch. I have to confess that in my former role as a Defense 
Department official with responsibility for a range of SC and IO issues, I was not always 
wholly grateful for your interest: you and your colleagues on the House Appropriations 
Committee put the Department through the ringer with quite a lot of different reporting 
requirements. As a citizen, however, I am deeply grateful to you for having kept us on 
our toes— and occasionally held our feet to the fire. This is a vital area, and we can’t 
afford either to ignore it or rest on our laurels. 
I would like to begin today by looking briefly at the emergence of the concept of 
“strategic communication” within the US government, and talk about some drawbacks to 
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the term itself. I’d then like to highlight some of the lessons we can draw from the decade 
since 9/11, and I will close by offering some thoughts on the future.  
Start with some semantics. The term “strategic communication” isn’t particularly new; in 
the corporate world, it’s been used for several decades to describe the cluster of activities 
relating to—for lack of a better phrase—making the corporate entity “look good.”  For 
corporations, it’s pretty straightforward: the corporate goal is profit maximization, and 
while different corporations take different routes to maximizing profits, “looking good” is 
supported by marketing, advertising, public relations, community relations, and so on. 
“Strategic communication” became the umbrella term for these various activities—
activities themselves distinct from underlying questions of product quality, etc. --and in 
the context of the corporate world there’s absolutely nothing wrong with the term.  
But whoever first decided to import the term “strategic communication” into the 
governmental context has a lot to answer for. I’m sure the importation of the term was 
well-intended, but to be honest, the term has caused far more confusion that clarity. This 
is so for two reasons. 
First, the term gets used in so many different ways that by now no one really knows what 
it’s supposed to mean. In the corporate context, having a concept that lacks precise 
meaning is fine, and it’s equally fine for different organizations to use the term in 
different ways. And while fraud is illegal, we don’t expect corporate strategic 
communications to refrain from mystification and exaggeration. (Who would buy Coke if 
Coke ads described it simply as “sweet, fizzy brown liquid that tastes somewhat like 
Pepsi, except some people like it better”?)  But in the government context, in which truth 
is a fundamental moral constraint and in which policies must be set, budgets developed 
and authorities defended, it can be much more of a problem to have a term that’s 
characterized by fuzziness rather than precision.  
Specifically, in the government context “strategic communication” is often confused with 
related terms such as “information operations,’ “public diplomacy” and 
“communications.”  It’s important to draw some distinctions between these concepts, 
however, since otherwise we can start getting very muddled up, and conflate capabilities 
with processes, aspirations with tools for achieving those aspirations. We can start 
developing budget lines to support concepts that were meant to be merely explanatory, 
not activities unto themselves. Worse, we can end up deciding we need to create new and 
cumbersome bureaucratic structures to manage these supposedly new functions, without 
recognizing that such structures may be unnecessary, inefficient and duplicative. If 
importing the term “strategic communication” into government ends up meaning we 
create new structures that merely replicate the functions already performed by public 
affairs or public diplomacy organizations, we won’t have gained much. 
So if that’s what strategic communication shouldn’t mean, what should it mean? If the 
term strategic communication is going to mean anything at all in a government context, 
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it’s got to mean something different from existing terms. To use another corporate term, 
the term “strategic communication” has to add value, or there’s not much point.  
So when I use the term “strategic communication,” I want to make it clear that I am using 
the Defense Department understanding of the term, not the corporate understanding of 
the term. DoD defines strategic communication as “Focused United States Government 
efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve 
conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, 
and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and 
products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.”  
That’s quite a mouthful, but it can actually be explained more simply. For DoD, and for 
me, strategic communication is a process—the exceptionally hard to achieve process of 
communicating strategically. It’s not simply the conglomeration of several 
communication tools and capabilities. Public affairs and media relations are tools, 
capabilities that can support strategic communication. Traditional public diplomacy – 
cultural exchanges and radio broadcasting such as Voice of America—is also a tool that 
can support strategic communication. Information operations—the use of specific 
information-related capabilities in a military context to affect adversary decision-making 
– can also support strategic communication.  But PA, public diplomacy and IO are not 
the same as strategic communication, and strategic communication isn’t simply a matter 
of throwing all these tools at a particular problem.   
At risk of sounding tautological, strategic communication is communicating strategically: 
it’s the thoughtful integration of issues of stakeholder perception and response into 
policy-making, planning and operations at every level… and the orchestration of actions, 
images and words in support of our policy objectives. By its nature, strategic 
communication must be receiver-centric, rather than sender-centric. It’s less about what 
we have to say than it is about considering what others hear and understand.  
If you’re still not sure what I’m talking about when I say ‘strategic communication,” 
think of it the other way around: ask yourself what “un-strategic communication” is.  I’ll 
give a very simple example: “un-strategic” communication is what happened when the 
Obama Administration conveyed a significant shift in our missile defense policy to our 
Polish allies, a shift that involved a decision not to carry through with previous plans to 
base certain missile defenses on Polish soil—and we managed to announce it more or less 
on the 70th anniversary of the Russian invasion of Poland.  
Whoops. Our intended message—that we felt our new approach to missile defense would 
provide Poland with even greater security—was drowned out, for many Poles, by the 
unhappy juxtaposition of our changed policy and the anniversary of the Russian invasion. 
We said we were moving to a ‘smarter, phased, adaptive” approach to missile defense. 
Many Poles heard “abandonment.” 
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What would it have taken to communicate strategically, rather than un-strategically, 
about our changed missile defense strategy? Assuming that the missile defense strategy 
itself was sound, improved strategic communication would have required not simply 
better speeches and press statements, but more listening, more consultation, more 
engagement, and better planning.   
I’m sure we can all think of plenty of other examples of un-strategic communication.  So 
when I say “strategic communication,” I don’t mean public affairs or public diplomacy or 
information operations, though each is important. What I mean is that difficult but critical 
process of listening, engaging, understanding perceptions, and then trying, in an 
orchestrated way, to align a wide range of capabilities in order to affect people’s 
perceptions in ways that advance our national interests.  
It should go without saying that strategic communication is as much about what we do as 
what we say: your third grade teacher probably told you that “actions speak louder than 
words,” and she was right. If the term “strategic communication” has any value at all in a 
government context, this is what it must mean. 
That’s enough about semantics. I said that there were two reasons to regret the 
importation of the term strategic communication from the corporate world to the 
government world. One is the semantic confusion I just discussed. But there’s another 
reason, too, to feel some regret over the importation of the term strategic communication 
from the corporate world to the government world. And that’s simply that the US 
government isn’t a corporation.  The US government doesn’t exist to sell a product or 
maximize profits. Our mission is far more complex than the mission of a corporation, and 
as a result, the importation of the corporate term strategic communication can cause 
substantial confusion, leading to inappropriate assumptions about accountability, metrics, 
methods and timeframes. 
Think of it like this: say your company makes SpritaPepsaCola. Say you want to expand 
SpritaPepsaCola into Botswana. You want convince people that SpritaPepsaCola is the 
best soda around, so you can sell more SpritaPepsaCola to more Botswanans. You want a 
full-throttle strategic communication campaign to that end. Simple. 
Actually, of course, it’s not all that simple. To sell SpritaPepsaCola to Botswanan 
consumers, there are all sorts of things you need to understand first. You need to figure 
out how loyal Botswanans are to other brands of cola; you need to understand the source 
and roots of that loyalty; you need to identify local bottlers, you need to figure out 
distribution routes, you need marketing campaigns, and so on. It all needs to be mutually 
reinforcing. All that, for a simple cola!  
But even so, it’s a simple cola, and at the end of the day, it’s not that hard to tell if your 
strategic communication campaign is working. Are Botswanans buying more 
SpritaPepsaCola?  This can readily be quantified. You can make fine-looking charts 
showing the delta in sales over a specified time period. And if you want to understand 
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why Botswanans are buying or not buying SpritaPepsaCola, you can always poll them, 
interview them, or conduct focus groups. Did your ad campaign lead them to buy more? 
Would they prefer that SpritaPepsaCola be a bit less sweet? No problem: the stakes or 
pretty low. Everyone likes to talk about cola; no one has much incentive to lie to you 
about whether and why they prefer Coke.  
But US foreign policy and national security objectives are not like a soda. People in other 
countries support or oppose our foreign policy objectives for reasons that are far more 
complex than the reasons they buy a particular brand of soda. Policies are nuanced; sodas 
are simple. Soda sales are easily quantified, and when it comes to soda sales, we can 
relatively easily assess the relationship between stated attitudes and behaviors. With our 
national security objectives, it’s a whole lot harder. What attitudes should we look at? 
How should we measure them? How is behavior linked to attitudes and opinions? What’s 
the relevant timeframe?  
These are hard questions, and much of the time, the answer is that we really aren’t sure. 
Our strategic communication efforts often involve throwing a whole lot of spaghetti at a 
whole lot of walls, and hoping some of it sticks. In this case, the spaghetti is our words, 
our policies and actions, posters, billboards, radio shows, exchange programs, 
educational and cultural programs, and on the intel side, perhaps some covert efforts to 
influence attitudes in specific places. It’s still all spaghetti, and frequently we just don’t 
know which of it’s going to stick. 
But don’t be too appalled by the metaphor. The spaghetti is often pretty good spaghetti, 
made with care and thought. If it doesn’t stick, it’s not necessarily because it’s badly 
made. Strategic communication is hard because it’s hard. Strategic communication is, in 
a fundamental sense, an aspirational concept. We’re never going to get in 100% right; 
there are always going to be too many variables, many of them beyond our control. But 
as a government, we still have to try. 
To make it more concrete, take the strategic communication challenge of reducing 
support for the Taliban among Afghans. Compare it to the strategic communication 
challenge of selling our fictitious soda. 
In each case, we’ll certainly try to use some of the same tools: press statements, 
community events, television and radio, engagement with key leaders/role models. But 
the “product” is far harder to define in the national security context: what are we selling? 
The stakes are higher, and the link between opinion and behavior is also far more 
complex: “support” for the Taliban can take many forms, from volunteering to fight for 
them to simply refraining from actively undermining them by aiding the Coalition 
instead. Support for the Taliban can have many motivations: loyalty, identity, ideology, 
fear, economic well-being. For many Taliban “supporters,” opinions and attitudes about 
the Taliban may be far less important than economic necessity or day to day security. 
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There’s an issue of time horizon, too: we want to change behaviors over the long term. 
There are far more options than cola/not-cola, or SpritaPepsaCola versus coke versus a 
local brand. There are far more actors in the field, and, to top it all off, it’s far harder to 
get anyone to talk to us. The Taliban don’t usually want to sit down in focus groups.  
Add in the usual problems of barriers of language and culture, and you’re looking at a 
multifaceted, constantly evolving challenge. Can we achieve strategic communication 
successes in that context? Definitely, and I would be happy to discuss some of those 
successes during the discussion time. Can we reliably achieve strategic communication 
successes across the board? Definitely not, and if we have unrealistic expectations about 
the ease or rapidity with which we can succeed, we will only undermine our own efforts. 
So the second problem with importing the term “strategic communication” from the 
corporate world to the government world is that it creates the illusion that we are dealing 
with something that is relatively simple and straightforward, when in fact we’re not. The 
term strategic communication thus lends itself to false analogies. Take the much-cited 
complaint, for instance, usually attributed to the late and lamented Richard Holbrooke, 
that a “man in a cave” was “out-communicating the world’s leading communication 
society.”   
The “communication society” skills Holbrooke was referring to were of course mainly  
those of Hollywood and Madison Avenue-- communication skills that are not irrelevant 
to USG strategic communication, but that are also no panacea in the far more complex 
national security context.  Being good at selling soda— or making movies people like to 
watch, or winning elections, for that matter— doesn’t necessarily translate into being 
good at changing the complex, bundled attitudes and behaviors of millions of people in 
foreign countries.  
And the “man in the cave”? That, of course, was the equally late but entirely unlamented 
Osama bin Laden, about whom it’s worth noting two things. First, no wonder he 
appeared to be out-communicating us for a while there! He had the both the home court 
advantage and the underdog advantage. But second, bin Laden didn’t out-communicate 
anyone, in the end. The Arab Spring left him behind, and in the end his death was almost 
anti-climactic-- his relevance was already so greatly diminished.  
Let me pause on each of those points: what gave Bin Laden his initial strategic 
communication “edge,” and why he lost it. Each has lessons for the US government as 
we go forward. 
First, the home court advantage: to state the obvious, it’s easier to change the minds and 
behaviors of people you understand. They say all politics is local: perhaps all strategic 
communication is fundamentally local, too. To sell SpritaPepsaCola—or al Qaeda, for 
that matter— it sure helps to know the human terrain, as the military puts it. It helps to 
know the local language, the history, the narratives that resonate in people’s minds, the 
day to day pressures, the long-nurtured grievances, the cherished hopes. If you don’t 
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know these things, you make mistakes (consider my missile defense example). You 
sound klutzy, overbearing, tone-deaf, or simply ridiculous.  
It’s also often easier to be the perceived underdog.  In life as in sports, there’s sometimes 
a tendency to root for the “little guy,” and for a time, bin Laden managed to exploit this: 
There we were, the big, unilateralist United States, rich, fat and happy amidst a world of 
poverty and pain. For some populations  in parts of the world that globalization left 
behind, it must have been easy to hate us; easy to take some pleasure, at least a bit of 
schadenfreude,  as the world’s largest military power flailed around, seemingly 
hopelessly, in search of one man. (That this one man was the scion of a vastly rich Saudi 
family and had powerful government backers was something bin Laden and has 
supporters tended not to emphasize).  
So we shouldn’t be surprised if bin Laden seemed to “out-communicate” us for a while. 
And we shouldn’t waste time feeling hurt and misunderstood, either.  Being a world 
power comes with a price: you’re a lightning rod for animosity and global grievance. If 
anything, we should rather take comfort in the fact that relatively speaking, the US is 
getting off lightly: while today global publics remain quite critical of the US, a recent 
Gallup poll suggests they’re even more critical of other candidates for global power 
status.1 Compared to China, Russia, France, Germany, Britain and Japan, we’re actually 
pretty popular. 
More to the point, though, bin Laden didn’t out-communicate anyone in the end. Even 
with his early home court advantage in the Muslim world – even with his early, if 
dubious, underdog status-- he ended up marginalized well before he ended up dead.  His 
status and influence steadily declined after 9/112, as Arab and Muslim publics grew 
disenchanted with extremism and terrorism. Even amongst those who are still inclined to 
support extremist groups, al Qaeda has been significantly discredited; a December 2010 
Pew poll found that al Qaeda enjoyed far less support in the Arab world than either 
Hamas or Hezbollah. 3 
This shouldn’t surprise us. Since 9/11, al Qaeda-spawned terrorism has exacted a far 
more lethal toll on Muslim civilians than it ever did on the US or our Western allies. 
Maybe bin Laden never had a third grade teacher who explained that actions speak louder 
than words. In the end, al Qaeda’s actions spoke for themselves, and no amount of 
ringing rhetorical appeals to jihad and Islamic unity could make up for the streets and 
markets awash in blood.  
                                                            
1“ Worldwide Approval of U.S. Leadership Tops Major Powers,” Gallup, March 24, 2011, at  
http://www.gallup.com/poll/146771/worldwide‐approval‐leadership‐tops‐major‐powers.aspx 
2 “Osama bin Laden Largely Discredited Among Muslim Publics in Recent Years,” Pew, May 2, 2011, at   
http://pewglobal.org/2011/05/02/osama‐bin‐laden‐largely‐discredited‐among‐muslim‐publics‐in‐recent‐years/ 
 
3 “Muslim Publics Divided on hamas and Hezbollah,” Pew, Dec. 2, 2010, at 
http://pewglobal.org/2010/12/02/muslims‐around‐the‐world‐divided‐on‐hamas‐and‐hezbollah/ 
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So what does all this mean for the United States? Looking back at the last decade, what 
did we do well, and what do we need to do as we move forward? 
In the initial post 9/11 period, the USG made what I think was a major mistake in its 
strategic communication efforts. At a moment when global publics were shocked by 9/11 
and poised to respond with sympathy, we conformed with a script that might as well have 
been written by bin Laden himself.  We validated bin Laden’s “special” status, and we 
began to view the world largely through the lens our of counterterrorism goals. 
We raised our walls, making it far harder to foreigners—especially Arab and Islamic 
foreigners—to come to our shores, and thousands of Muslims already here, including 
many US citizens, found themselves treated as the potential enemy, pulled in for FBI 
questioning or in danger of losing their visas.  Most of these Arab and Muslims had zero 
connection to terrorism, but in America right after 9/11, all Arabs and Muslims came 
under suspicion. At the very moment when we should have reached out in friendship to 
the millions of Muslims around the globe who condemned terrorism, we withdrew. This 
along greatly diminished the degree of global cooperation we received, particularly in 
Arab and Muslim communities. 
Just as bad, we turned bin Laden into a larger-than-life bogey-man. By declaring 
ourselves at war with him, by focusing so many of our official statements on this one 
man, we elevated his stature, giving him disproportionate and unprecedented prestige. To 
be sure, he already had a platform. But we made it higher.  
I want to be crystal clear here: Osama bin Laden killed thousands of American and 
others, mostly innocent noncombatants. He committed war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. But I do not believe he posed an existential threat to the United States. Yet in 
our early responses to him, we bestowed on him the very prestige he sought—we treated 
him like he was more powerful than Hitler and Stalin combined, like the most dangerous 
man in the history of the world. We acted as though the fate of our nation depended on 
our ability to find and kill that one evil man.  
It didn’t. Our nation has survived revolution, civil war, two world wars, the Cold War 
and nuclear stand-off.  We have faced worse than al Qaeda before, and no doubt we will 
face worse again. But treating bin Laden—and al Qaeda—as existential threats gave him 
prestige and a powerful early recruiting tool with disaffected Muslim publics. Remember 
his home field and underdog advantage? Our own rhetoric and actions greatly boosted 
that advantage in the first years after 9/11. For a frightening few years, al Qaeda seemed 
poised to become one of the world’s most rapidly metastasizing franchises, while the US’ 
initial inability to capture bin Laden in Afghanistan, and our resulting pivot to war in 
Iraq, left many Middle Eastern observers concluding that a blinding obsession with Bin 
Laden was damaging our judgment and weakening our superpower status.  
Meanwhile, our tendency, during that early post/9/11 period, to view the Muslim world 
mainly through an “are you with us or are you against us” counterterrorism lens alienated 
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many moderates. For a time, it seemed as if everything we did, from our foreign 
humanitarian assistance programs to our cultural exchange programs, was done solely to 
enhance our CT goals. This forced many around the world to make a choice: if the price 
of US assistance and cooperation was signing on, no questions asked, to a blank 
counterterrorism check, did working with the US make sense?  
This period cost us dearly, and the costs were compounded by a number of events the 
loomed symbolically large around the globe. Abu Ghraib;  black sites; allegations of 
torture. While the vast majority of our military and civilian personnel upheld the highest 
moral and legal standards, the well-publicized willingness of a few—including a high-
ranking few-- to engage in and defend illegal activities enabled those in some quarters of 
the Muslim world to view America to as synonymous with abuse of power. 
Fortunately, imbalances do have a tendency to rebalance, and two things happened that 
helped get us out of the hole we were in in 2004 and 2005. For one thing, bin Laden and 
al Qaeda began to overreach. They grew ever more brutal and undiscriminating; one 2009 
study found, for instance, that 88% of those killed by al Qaeda attacks between 2004 and 
2008 were Muslims.4  
For another thing, we got smarter. Past the immediate shock of 9/11, we began to reassess 
our immediate responses, evaluate global reaction, and undo some of the damage we 
ourselves had unintentionally done to our own cause. We began to deemphasize the 
importance of bin Laden, depriving him of the prestige he so desperately needed. We 
began to shift, in Iraq and then in Afghanistan, to a more sophisticated strategy informed 
by counterinsurgency precepts. We began to emphasize the importance of establishing 
legitimacy and addressing genuine local needs. 
These trends began in the last years of the Bush administration, and were continued under 
the Obama administration. Early symbolic action helped turn the page on some of the 
darkest post 9/11 moments, with Obama’s January 2009 Executive Orders banning 
torture and secret detention facilities and mandating a review of US detention policy. 
Beyond that, the new Administration made a conscious decision to elevate the 
importance of strategic communication, appointing a high-level National Security Staff 
official with responsibility for USG-wide strategic communication. 
Even more important, the White House, with the concurrence of all executive branch 
departments, made another key decision: while counter-terrorism and counter-
radicalization would necessarily remain important goals of USG strategic 
communication, they would no longer be the centerpiece. As much as possible, we would 
try to disaggregate counter-terrorism from our broader programs and campaigns—we 
would stop viewing the world entirely through the often distorting prism of counter-
terrorism. We would try, at least, to listen more and talk less, and to ensure our words and 
                                                            
4“Al Qaeda kills 8 times more Muslims than Non‐Muslims,” Der Spiegel, Dec. 3, 2009, at   
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,660619,00.html 
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actions were thoughtfully informed by a nuanced understanding of what other publics 
heard and understood.  
In practice, this has had a number of very concrete manifestations. Direct CT-related 
communication efforts of course continued, particularly by DoD and the intelligence 
agencies; as long as terrorist organizations pose a threat, we will need carefully targeted 
programs aimed at those specific issues and audiences. But we also began focused efforts 
to move beyond the CT frame, and reach out—particularly to Muslims and Arabs, 
particularly to the educated and the young—over other issues of shared concern, such as 
science, technology, education, health care and entrepreneurship.  
We also sought to decentralize our strategic communication efforts as much as possible. 
Strategic communication is inherently complex and risky in the 24/7 media environment: 
all it takes is one US representative saying “the wrong thing” and there’s a global furor. 
(And that doesn’t even need to be a government representative: witness the global furor, 
and lethal riots, triggered by Pastor Terry Jones’ determination to burn a Koran). But at 
the same time, top-down messaging is doomed to failure in this messy, chaotic and 
democratic media environment. One lesson of the last ten years as that the risks of 
spoilers notwithstanding, we generally do better to empower more people—not just 
inside our government—to speak freely and engage freely than to try to “control” 
messages. 
 It’s a question of accepting tactical risk to increase the likelihood of strategic gain. Our 
greatest strength, as a government and a nation, is our people, as quarrelsome, 
complicated and unpredictable as they often are. The more we find ways to have our 
people speak to the citizens of other nations, the more we form strong bonds, build trust, 
and build knowledge.  
Right now, I believe we are still in an era of change and reform. The good news, I think, 
is that both on the Hill and within the Executive Branch, there is increasingly a shared 
understanding of the challenges ahead. Both the State Department and the Defense 
Department have made substantial structural changes in the last two years, designed to 
ensure that we will do a better job at strategic communication.  
At DoD, SC and IO-related definitions and management structures have been clarified, 
and a DoD-wide coordinating body exists to address department-wide strategic 
communication challenges, At State, the creation of deputy assistant secretaries with 
specific responsibility for public diplomacy within each regional bureau is also a helpful 
change, and the new Counterterrorism Strategic Communication Center, led by Richard 
LeBaron, has sought to take an innovative and nuanced approach to CT-specific 
challenges. Within the executive branch, coordination mechanisms are fairly robust, both 
as a result of NSS-led interagency policy committee meetings and as a result of more 
informal groups that deconflict activities between agencies. Still, there is much more to 
be done. 
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Looking forward, let me emphasize some things I believe we need more of and some 
things we need less of. When it comes to strategic communication, organizationally we 
need to continue to improve internal USG coordination and training mechanisms. We 
need to trust each other more, which means, for the White House and for senior leaders in 
general, letting go of what sometimes seems from the outside like a fixation on 
controlling the message. Messages that are overly controlled are often not very 
persuasive or effective.  
We also need to develop more sustained and robust mechanisms for linking up with the 
private sector. There are many things the US government can’t, won’t or shouldn’t do, 
but that may be appropriate for NGOs, universities and corporations. Many private 
organizations are eager to play a role in US strategic communication, and Congress and 
the Executive Branch need to find better ways to serve as enablers of private activity.  
We also need more old-fashioned public diplomacy: exchange programs, cultural 
programs, educational programs. People-to-people ties do matter, and we need to have 
more confidence both in our own people and in foreign publics. The budget cuts in public 
diplomacy program in the last decades have been nothing short of shameful, as well as 
deeply short-sighted. Foreign assistance, whether it takes the form of food aid or cultural 
programs, isn’t an act of charity. It’s a vital means of advancing our national interests, of 
building good will and developing the strong networks of friends and information sources 
that will stand us in good stead when hard times come-- as they will. Are there risks in 
greater openness, more exchanges and people-to-people ties? Certainly: every now and 
then, we’ll trust someone we shouldn’t trust, and pay a price. But as ever, it’s an issue of 
accepting some tactical risk for strategic gain. In the long run, we isolate ourselves at our 
own peril.  
Hard-head realists will argue that we shouldn’t obsess too much about inducing foreign 
publics to “like’ us. As long as they don’t attack us or aid our enemies, say the realists, it 
doesn’t much matter if other people like us or not. There is plenty of wisdom in this—if 
the protesters in Egypt’s Tahrir Square reject terrorism, that’s much more important than 
“liking” the United States.   
But it’s true only up to a point. An obsession with being loved and appreciated is not a 
good basis for strategic communication: sometimes people won’t like our policies, and 
we will have principled reasons for being unwilling to change them, and that’s that, and 
as it should be. But there is a difference between trying to generate a shallow “liking” 
versus trying to generate confidence and respect, even in the face of inevitable 
differences. There does appear to be a strong correlation between positive feelings about 
the United States and fewer attacks against US interests. Being liked is overvalued, and  
often impossible in a world where conflicting interest are inevitable. But efforts to build 
trust and understanding do pay off. 
Increasing old-fashioned public diplomacy takes money and, at times, political courage. 
It’s not easy to argue for increasing visas for people from Arab and Muslim countries 
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when letting in a single bad actor could lead to an intense backlash. It’s not easy to argue 
for more funds for cultural activities or economic aid overseas when people are hurting 
here at home. But in each case, we need to understand our activities as investments that 
will pay off over a longer time frame. If we under-invest now, it will be too late later.  
More generally, we must also ensure adequate funding for linguistic, regional and 
cultural training, both for our military and foreign service personnel, of course, but also 
in our civilian schools and universities more broadly. During the Cold War, the US 
Congress appropriated substantial funds for universities to start language and area 
training programs. Most of that money is long gone, and we risk having a population that 
can’t find Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya on a map, much less hope to communicate with 
anyone from one of these countries—or from China or India or any number of key 
partner states or rising powers, for that matter. 
Those are some of the things we need more of, as we move our strategic communication 
policy forward into this post-post-9/11 era. There are also some things we need less of. 
I’ve touched on them all already.  
We need less fixation on terrorism. It’s a threat, and an ongoing one, but an obsession 
with CT may blind us to other emerging threats and opportunities. Our strategic 
communication efforts should be just as focused on China, India and other rising powers 
as they are on terrorism, for instance—and the list goes on. We’re in a an unpredictable, 
dynamic, multipolar world; any fixation on a single threat is dangerous. 
We also need less of a zero-defect mentality. Effective strategic communication requires 
decentralization, which creates risk. We will make mistakes. Somewhere, right now, 
some US government employee is doing something dumb, maybe even illegal, in the 
name of strategic communication. It’s just inevitable. But there’s been a tendency, in the 
media and a bit here on the Hill, to throw the baby out with the bathwater: one foolish 
DoD radio spot? Slash the budget! One DoD contractor engaged in shady practices? 
Impose draconian new reporting requirements! I understand the temptation: no one hates 
idiocy in the name of strategic communication more than those government officials 
charged with defending and reforming US efforts. But you can’t legislate against human 
stupidity or venality-- and while seeking accountability is always appropriate, we also 
need to keep things in perspective.  
A corollary to this is that we need less obsession with metrics and assessments. Again, 
accountability is vital, but strategic communication is as much art as science, and it’s part 
of the long game. One or two budget cycles may tell you very little. Congress and the 
public rightly demand transparency, but failure to document clear and immediate links 
between strategic communication efforts and outcomes should not result in instant budget 
cuts. Strategic communication success is hard to quantify, and may not become apparent 
for years or even decades. Some of the spaghetti will stick, and some won’t, but that’s not 
a reason to stop trying out new spaghetti recipes. 
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Finally, we need less naval-gazing obsession with who does what. One of the least 
productive diversions in the strategic communication game is the endless round of “why 
is DoD doing X when really State should be doing X?”.  We have real and urgent 
government-wide needs to develop effective strategic communication strategies, and 
from my perspective, squabbling over the roles of different executive branch agencies is a 
waste of time.  
In an ideal world, State should be far better funded, and should be able to recruit and 
retain a far larger cadre of dedicated, well-trained officials. That would be nice, and I 
hope we will get there; those in Congress who would like to see the State Department do 
more than it currently does have a simple expedient, which is to give State some more 
money. But in the meantime, if the State Department lacks the funds or capacity to 
undertake programs or activities that are manifestly in the national interest, then of course 
other agencies should step in. If “whole of government” means anything at all, it must 
mean getting beyond petty squabbles about roles. The mission is too important. 
Mr. Chairman and members of the sub-committee, I will close here. I have touched on a 
wide range of issues in these prepared remarks. Even so, I recognize that in many ways 
these remarks only scratch the surface, and my oral remarks will necessarily be even 
briefer. I hope that some of these comments provide useful fodder for further discussion, 
and I look forward to talking about these issues with you and your staff. Thank you once 
again for inviting me to share these views. 
 
 
 
